People always seem to be doing something. They also seem for seemingly unbounded constructions of behavior. As philosto be quite adept at identifying what they are doing. What is less ophers have long noted, any segment of behavior can be conclear is how these two observations relate to one another. The sciously identified in many different ways (Anscombe, 1957 ; theory of action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985; WegAustin, 1961; Danto, 1963; Goldman, 1970; Ryie, 1949; Wittner & Vallacher, 1986 ) is explicitly concerned with this issue. At genstein, 1953) . Something as simple as "meeting someone," the heart of the theory are three interacting processes that specfor instance, could be recognized by anyone with an even mildly ify a causal interdependence between what people are doing and active mental life as "being social," "exchanging pleasantries," what they think they are doing. Through a delineation of these "learning about someone new," "revealing one's personality," processes, we hope to reveal how action constrains one's identior even "uttering words." But while representations of action fication of action and, in turn, how action identification exerts a admit to considerable variability and seem subject to noteworselecting and guiding force in subsequent action. The proposed thy change from moment to moment, behavior seems to follow causal interdependence between action and action identificaa more constrained path, often exhibiting a press toward COIntion proves useful in understanding a host of issues in human pletion in the face of situational forces, biological needs, and psychology that center on the mental control of action. These reinforcement contingencies. Thus, as interesting as cognitive issues are thus discussed in detail, with attention given in each representations may be in their own right, they are considered case to the points of contact between our analysis and prior conby many to operate independently of the causal mechanisms ceptualizations. We begin by reviewing the background and promoting overt action. principles of the theory.
Many psychologists, of course, balk at the notion that cognitive representations of action are mere epiphenomena, with no Cognition and Action necessary mapping onto specific overt behavioral events. Those
That people can think about what they do is hardly a contrawho have addr~~ this issue ~xplicitly, h~wever, commonl~ ~d-versial idea in psychology. The suggestion, however, that specivocate only. a liffiIted perspectIv: on the link between cognitIve fiable causal links exist between cognitive representations of acrepresentatIons and overt. behaVIor. ~us, so~e com~entators tion and overt behavior is greeted with skepticism in certain have s~ggested th~t beh~~or dynalnlcs are pnmary, WIth reprequarters. This skepticism is fueled in part by people's capacity sentatIo~s of actI°.n ansl~ after ~e fact, or .at best, conc~-rently WIth the actIon. This reflective connectIon finds ~xpliClt expression in such otherwise distinct theories as self-perception theory (Bern, 1972) and psychoanalysis (Freud, 1914 (Freud, /1960 . In The research reported in this article was supported in part by Grant self-perception theory, the true cause of behavior is some stimu-BNS 78-26380 from the National Science Foundation.
Ius in the action setting; if the actor does not recognize the stimWe wish to thank Roya Ayman, Susan Frank, Toni Giuliano, Lawulus as causal he or she casts about for other likely causal candirenr:e Messe, Th~mas Monson, James Penneb~ and four anonymous dates even i~venting inner dispositions if a plausible external reVIewers for theIr helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
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Cognitive representations are said to arise after the fact in an Levels o/Identification attempt to justify or make sense of what was done. Because the true motive is too painful to acknowledge, moreover, the perFundamental to the theory is the recognition that the various son's post hoc cognitions are, by definition, considered inaccuidentifications for an action do not exist as a random assemrate.
blage of unrelated elements. Instead, act identities bear systemOther systems stress what might be called the intent connecatic relations to one another in an organized cognitive represention. In this perspective, cognitive representations of action tation of the action-the action's identity structure. An identity .function as templates for subsequent overt behavior. James's structure is essentially a hierarchical arrangement of an action's (1890) analysis of ideomotor action, for instance, holds that an various identities. Lower level identities in this hierarchy conidea of action tends to produce the action unless something invey the details or specifics of the action and so indicate how the tervenes to prevent it. This is readily apparent in the case of action is done. Higher level identities convey a more general simple physical movements; to move a finger, one simply thinks understanding of the action, indicating why the action is done about doing so. Not surprisingly, then, the intent connection or what its effects and implications are. Relative to low-level provides a reasonable summary statement regarding contemidentities, higher level identities tend to be less movement deporary work on the cognitive control of basic movements (e.g., fined and more abstract and to provide a more comprehensive Adams, 1971; Norman & Shallice, 1980; Rosenbaum, Kenny, understanding of the action. Identification level is a relative con-& Derr, 1983; Schmidt, 1975) . With respect to actions of sigcept, of course, and so whether a given act identity is considered nificant duration or importance in people's lives, however, the a means or an end, a detail or an implication, depends on the role of cognitive representations of action in guiding action is act identity with which it is compared. less established. What little is known about the cognition-ac-
The distinction between relatively low-and high-level identition link in the context of meaningful behavior has been inties is communicated in everyday language when people indiferred from work in cognitive behavior therapy (e.g., Meichencate that one performs one act identity by performing another baum, 1977); decision making (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tver-(Goldman, 1970) . Thus, one sees if someone is home by pushing sky, 1982); and traditional social-psychological attitude a doorbell, and one pushes a doorbell by moving a finger. Alresearch (e.g., Azjen & Fishbein, 1977) . A direct analysis of how though these three act identities all pertain to the same act, they people think about their most far-reaching and consequential exist at different levels in a cognitive hierarchy by virtue of their actions, and how such thoughts may affect the nature of these perceived functional asymmetry. "Seeing if someone is home" actions, is thus missing in contemporary psychology.
occupies the highest level, "pushing a doorbell" the next high-A compelling case can be made for both the reflective and est, and "moving a finger" the lowest level. Our research has intent connections. People do seem to develop representations confirmed that people appreciate the notion of an asymmetric of their action after the fact, but they also seem capable of planby relation and can use this relational property to distinguish ning and directing their action in accord with their cognitive among act identities (Vallacher, Wegner, Bordieri, & Wenzlaff, representations. What is needed, then, is a system that provides 1981). for integration of these two prototypical cognition-action links, specifying the conditions under which one or the other is likely Theoretical Principles to occur. This is the task of action identification theory. The theory holds that the relationship between cognitive representaThe differences between low-and high-level identities when ., nons and overt behavior is not unidirectional, but cyclical. considered in conjunction with the three principles of the theThrough the intent connection, cognitive representations genory, indicate how the "uncertain act" is resolved realistically by .. erate action, and through the reflective connection, new repre-people in everyday life. The first principle holds that action is sentations of what one is doing can emerge to set the stage for a maintained with respect to its prepotent identity This principle revised intent connection. In this way, people sometimes are led acknowledges the mental control of action that is reflected in a to maintain a course of action over an extended period of time broad spectrum of theoretical traditions (e.g., Carver & Scheier, and on other occasions are led to show dramatic changes in be-1981; James, 1890; Luria, 1961; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, haviorfrom one moment to the next. 1960; Powers, 1973; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Vygotsky, 1962) . Thus, people have in mind a certain idea of what they are doing Action Identification Theory or want to do and use this prepotent identity as a frame of reference for implementing the action, monitoring its occurrence, The essence of the theory is that the identification of one's and reflecting on its attainment. Because act identities exist at action, though highly variable in principle, is ultimately condifferent levels, this principle also holds that people maintain strained by reality. Through the interplay of three processes, action at different levels. A person may set out simply to "move each framed as a principle of the theory, people are said to gravia finger," for instance, and monitor subsequent action to see tate toward an identification of action that proves effective in whether this intention has been fulfilled, or the person may set maintaining the action. In this section, we present these princiout to "dial the phone" (a higher level identity) or "call home" pIes and show their coordinated operation in determining ac-(a yet higher level identity), and monitor the attainment of tion identification. In the sections to follow, we develop specific whichever identity is prepotent. determinants of action identification that derive from this analThis principle is useful for understanding instances of action ysis and develop the implications of the theory for recurring stability, the maintenance of a given action over time and across issues in psychology.
circumstances. Thus, as long as a particular act identity is pre-1 I potent, it provides direction for action in the service of identity how much the person thought he or she was enacting them. The I attainment. Stability is an important and noteworthy feature of accumulation of high-level identities through coincidence or .I human action, of course, but so is the potential for change and chance, or through more standard avenues of emergence such as ! apparent inconsistency. The second and third principles repreenvironmental cues and social feedback processes, could charge I sent two basic processes underlying the manifestation of such even the simplest act with unconstrained significance, leaving , change. the actor "buried in thought" (Tolman, 1932) and allowing only The second principle holds that when both a lower and a occasional contact with the world of real behavior. higher level act identity are available. there is a tendency for the Action identification is brought back to reality through a prohigher level identity to become prepotent. The idea here is simcess specified in the theory's third principle: When an action ply that people are always sensitive to the larger meanings, cannot be maintained in terms of its prepotent identit~ there is effects, and implications of what they are doing. This tendency a tendency for a lower level identity to become prepotent. The is reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in a variety of psychological idea here is simply that people must sometimes concern themsystems. Learning under reinforcement contingencies (e.g., selves with the how-to aspects of action in order to perform the Skinner, 1953) , the mastery of skilled action (e.g., Bruner, 1970;  action. A person may set out to "change a light bulb," for inBryan & Harter, 1899; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970) , Gestalt stance, but unless that action is automated to an appreciable principles of perception (e.g., Kofika, 1935) , even the existenextent, he or she may have to consciously plan and monitor such tialists' focus on the "search for meaning" (e.g., Frankl, things as "grasping the bulb at its widest point," "t~ the 1963)-all of these seemingly distinct dynamics have in combulb counterclockwise," and so forth. Even if the action has bemon the notion that act representations expand to encompass come automated through repeated experience, its details might " broader effects and meanings. In learning, a relatively basic act still become prepotent if the action were to be disrupted by .
expands to incorporate the reinforcing effects of the act; in the some means. The light bulb, for instance, may prove to be stuck development of mastery, discrete acts become automated and in its socket, in which case the person might give conscious conintegrated into a larger action unit; in Gestalt psychology, parts sideration to "grasping" and "turning" at the temporary exbecome unified to produce a whole; and in existentialism, patpense of the higher level "changing" identity. In the attempt to terns discerned in distinct actions become the basis for new maintain action under one identity, one must often abandon awareness of what one is doing and who one is.
that identity in favor of more performable identities. So, alMuch of the research on action identification to date has fothough a person may be inclined to adopt any of a host ofhigher cused on the emergence of higher level identities in accordance level identities for an action, these identities dissipate in short with the second principle (Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Di- order if they prove to be ineffective guides to subsequent action. zadji, 1986; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps,
The potential for flights of fancy that is inherent in the second 1984). This research confirms that any time a person has only principle is unlikely to represent a serious problem for most a low-level understanding of what he or she is doing, there is a people, then, because of the reality orientation inherent in the readiness to accept any higher level identity made available by third principle. the context surrounding the action and that this emergent idenResearch to date has documented the potential for movement tity can promote wholly new courses of action. In a study by to lower levels of identification in the face of high-level disrup- Wegner et al. (1986, Experiment 1) , for instance, subjects who tion. In a study by Wegner et al. (1984, Experiment 2) , for inidentified the act of "participating in an experiment" in terms stance, experienced coffee drinkers were asked to drink coffee of its details were found to be more susceptible to a suggestion from one of two rather different cups-a normal cup and an that they were either "behaving altruistically" (e.g., helping the unwieldly cup weighing approximately 0.5 kg. Upon compleexperimenter) or "behaving selfishly" (e.g., earning extra credtion of this act, subjects were asked to rate how well each of its). These subjects, moreover, chose to participate in subse-30 identities for coffee drinking described what they had done. quent activities that were consistent with their emergent underSubjects in the normal cup condition tended to give relatively standing. In another study (Wegner et al., 1986, Experiment 2) , strong endorsement to identities such as "getting energized" or subjects were presented with bogus personality feedback indi-"promoting my caffeine habit." Subjects in the unwieldly cup cating that they were either cooperative or competitive. In comcondition, for whom the act of drinking proved diffIcult to do, parison with subjects who had initially described their behavior tended to give relatively strong endorsement to identities at a for analysis at a comprehensive (high) level, those who desubstantially lower level, such as "drinking a liquid," "swallowscribed their behavior at a detailed (low) level were more accepting," and "lifting a cup to my lips." Presumably, these subjects ing of the feedback and more likely to volunteer for future activcould not "energize themselves" or "promote their caffeine ities consistent with the feedback.
habit" with only these identities in mind. Instead, to accomIf this were the only mechanism by which identifications of plish the act at all, they had to think about the mechanics of action showed change, people's mental life might indeed be one coffee drinking, and this low-level orientation became prepoof fantasy, with little relation to overt behavior. Thus, a person tent, temporarily at least, in lieu of their accustomed way of could come to look upon "maintaining eye contact" as "winthinking about the act. ning trust," "throwing dice" as "winning money," or even "sit-A similar effect was obtained by Wegner, Connally, Shearer, .ting with my legs crossed while watching TV" as "controlling and in a study involving the act of eating. All the outcome of the Super Bowl." While these identities could subjects were invited to "eat Cheetos." But whereas some subwell make sense at the time of their emergence, they may have jects were to eat the Cheetos in the usual manner (with their a tenuous relation at best to any subsequent behavior, no matter hands), other subjects were asked to retrieve the Cheetos with a pair of chopsticks. This latter technique proved difficult to do, ments. This idea, of course, is inherent in the second principle and when asked subsequently what they had done, subjects in of the theory and has been confirmed in the research on action the chopsticks condition tended to eschew identities like "eatemergence alluded to earlier Wegner et al., ing," "reducing hunger," and "getting nutrition" in favor of 1984) . Thus, unless one already has a clear sense of the iafger lower level identities like "chewing," "swallowing," "putting meaning of what one is doing, there is a readiness to embrace food in my mouth," and "moving my hands." Subjects in the new identifications of action provided by the context in which nonchopsticks condition, meanwhile, gave weaker endorsement one is acting. to these lower level identities and correspondingly stronger enAt the same time, certain kinds of contextual factors can dorsement to the various higher level identities ("reducing hunmove a person to relatively low levels of identification. Foremost ger," "getting nutrition," etc.). As in the coffee drinking study, among these factors are those that serve to disrupt action (e.g., then, difficulty in enacting an action normally identified at high Wegner et al., 1984, Experiment 2) . Thus, level promoted a movement to a lower level of identification.
an awkward cup can make one think of the details associated The three principles of the theory work together in such a with "drinking," and poor transmission quality during a phone way that maintainable identifications of one's action ultimately call can change the prepotent identity of one's action from "exdevelop. There is a constant press for higher level understanding changing gossip" to "making myself heard" or "speaking loudly and control of action, but this press is countermanded by moveand clearly." Beyond their potential for disrupting action, some , ment to lower levels of identification when the higher level idensituations offer ambiguous or inconsistent cues as to the meanf tities cannot be enacted automatically. Over time and repeated ing or effect of what one is doing. In social situations, for in-, action, the oscillations reflected in this dynamic interplay begin stance, it is often hard to discern whether one is creating a good to flatten out, and the person converges on an identity at a paror bad impression, demonstrating wit or poor taste, and so on. ticular level that enables him or her to perform the action up to
The only thing one knows for sure is that one is "talking," "geshis or her capacity. For any given action performed by a particuturing," and the like. Uncertainty regarding the effects and imlar person, then, the range of potential understanding is likely plications of one's behavior is especially likely in novel settings to be notably restricted in the service of effective action control. lacking familiar cues to higher level meaning. A person in such a setting may be prone to accept any higher level identities made Determinants of Identification Level available, but until these identities are provided the person is left with only a rudimentary sense of what he or she is doing. The principles of the theory suggest in a general way how peaFinally, in some contexts a person may be asked to monitor the pIe come to an unambiguous understanding of what they are details of his or her behavior as it is being enacted and in this doing. To enable predictions regarding specific instances of acway experience a lower level of identification than would nortion identification, however, it is necessary to relate the promally be the case (e.g., Wegner et al., 1986 , Experiment 2; Wegcesses outlined in the theory to factors amenable to operational ner et al., 1984, Experiment 1). definition. Three sets of such factors would seem to play especially pivotal roles in promoting unequivocal act knowledge: Action Difficulty the context in which the action takes place, the action's difficulty, and the person's experience with the action. Each of these Contextual cues to identities at different levels are probably influences on prepotent identification is discussed in turn.
present in the majority of everyday circumstances. The novelty of a particular setting could make one sensitive to the lower level Action Context features o~what on~ is do.ing, for exa~ple, while. the ~v.aIuative pressures 10 the setting IDlght render higher levelldentitles (e.g., Knowing only the physical movements involved in an action, "impress others," "show my skill") prepotent. For this reason, it is difficult to know what was done. As Danto (1963) has obcontext alone is rarely an unambiguous guide to a person's preserved, without knowledge of circumstances or events outside potent level of identification. Our analysis suggests a far less the action itself, one is left with only the most rudimentary of equivocal guide to identification level-the action's personal identities, or what he called a "basic act." It is through sensitivlevel of difficulty. ity to contextual cues that movement becomes represented in Some things are harder to do than others. A person may set terms of its causal effects, conventional interpretations, and the out to "push a doorbell," for example, and find that this identity like. What appears to be the same action can therefore be identiis easily enacted. The person may then try to "sell a set of encyfied in vastly different ways depending on the relative salience of clopedias" to the person answering the doorbell-a somewhat various cues to identification provided by the action's context. more formidable task. As the action begins to unfold, the per-"Solving a math puzzle," for instance, might be thought ofprison finds it necessary to suspend the "selling" identity in favor marilyas "keeping track of numbers" or "making mental calcuof more specific identities such as "sounding sincere," "appearlations" in one setting (e.g., the privacy of one's home) but as ing respectful yet confident," and "raising the issue of res pons i-"showing my math skill" or "trying not to embarrass myself" ble parenthood." Each of these identities, in turn, may prove in another (e.g., a testing situation).
somewhat difficult to maintain, in which case the person will Context often imparts a relatively high level of identification probably begin to think in terms of yet lower level identities. to action. It is difficult to look upon what one is doing as simply "Sounding sincere," for example, may require "furrowing one's a set of movements when there are circumstantial and social eyebrows," "making continuous eye contact," and "talking in a cues as to the labels, effects, and implications of these moveslow and deliberate tone of voice."
This example illustrates a very basic point: The more difficult Variation in identification level holds two key implications maintenance with respect to them; the second principle befor action control. The first concerns action stability. When an comes ascendant over the third principle. As these high-level action is undertaken with only a relatively low-level identity in identities then become mastered, the person is in a position to mind, there is a tendency to accept a higher level identity made maintain the action with respect to yet higher level identities, available by the action's context, and this new understanding of and so on, in a progression that leads to both greater proficiency what one is doing can serve to change dramatically the course and more comprehensive understanding of the action. No matof one's subsequent behavior. A person who is simply "riding a ter how proficient one is at an action, then, there is always a way bike," for example, may come to look upon the action as "seeing to identify what one is doing so as to rekindle the challenge of the neighborhood," "unwinding from a hard day," or "getting effective maintenance.
exercise," depending on the contextual cues surrounding the The progression from low to high level identity prepotence act. Each of these higher level identities is associated with an with increments in action experience is demonstrated in an inarray of lower level identities besides bike riding and so could vestigation by Vallacher, Wegner, and Frederick (1981) . We transform the act entirely. "Seeing the neighborhood," for inasked a group of subjects (N = 116) to tell us what they do when stance, might result in parking the bike and walking in order to they engage in each of five distinct actions-tennis, karate, piget a better look; "unwinding" might lead the person home and ano playing, writing, and the video game Space Invaders.2 Acto the liquor cabinet. tion identification questionnaires were provided for this purHigh-level identification, meanwhile, lends itself to action pose, each consisting of 36-38 one-sentence descriptions of the stability because it effectively shields the person against the action under consideration. Subjects were to rate (on 7-point emergence of alternative identities that could substantially scales) how well each identity statement described the action for change the nature of subsequent action. In essence, a person them. Factor analyses of these ratings revealed a low-level factor with a relatively high level understanding already knows what for each action as well as several higher level factors. A low-level he or she is doing and thus is less primed to accept other underindex was computed for each action that represented a subject's standings at the same level provided by the context surrounding summed ratings of identities loading on the low-level factor relthe action. Such understanding allows people to maintain a ative to his or her summed ratings across all factors.
course of action in the face of changing conditions and with the The low-level index was then correlated with a self-report passage of time. The bike rider who is "getting exercise," for measure of subjects' experience with the action. The correinstance, is likely to persist in this action regardless of new poslations were negative for every action (~ ranged from -.17 to sibilities for action that might become available. -.56), reaching statistical significance in three of the five cases.
The second implication of variation in identification level A similar pattern was observed when the low-level index was concerns action flexibility. When an action is maintained at a correlated with subjects' self-reported proficiency at the action relatively high level, its physical manifestation may appear to (ffl ranged from -.19 to -.45). So, for actions as diverse as video change markedly from one occasion to the next. The bike rider games and piano playing, there is a waning of low-level prepo-"getting exercise," for instance, may disembark from the bike to tence as the actor gains familiarity and proficiency with the acdo something that looks quite different (e.g., jogging), although tion. In rendering actions progressively more familiar, more auphenomenologically he or she is still doing the same thing. tomatic, and otherwise easier to do, experience enables action Lower level identities, on the other hand, come closer to specifyto be understood in terms that transcend the action's mechanising the physical movements involved in the action and so admit tic underpinnings and highlight instead its potential meanings, t~ far less variability in their mode of enactment. "Riding a effects, and implications. bIke" encompasses such lower level acts as speeding up, slowing Identification Level and Behavior -~-:Uon identification tendencies of those who indicated they had
The principles of the theory suggest that there is always connever, ~onned the action and of those ~ho ,were in the initial stages of action involvement were also explored in this study. maintenance considerations that influence prepotency on the part of tion difficulty, and personal expertise, the Immediate precursor act performers, the data relevant to these perspectives are not considered to action is a mental representation of what one is doing. The here. For a presentation and theoretical consideration of these data, see representations -that guide action, however, admit to consider- Vallacher and Wegner (1985, Chap. 7) ,~ down, and turning corners, for example, but unlike "getting exis clearly a delicate process, one that is sensitive to various forms ercise," it does not encompass getting off the bike to jog. Thus, of interference. I with increments in identification level, there is a corresponding The potential for interference reflects the simple fact that an , increase in the range of interchangeable means available for action's prepotent identity is shaped by the context in which maintaining the action, and this imparts a noteworthy degree the action occurs. Thus, an environmental press toward higher of flexibility to action. level identities for one's action could serve to impair perforWhen an action is controlled with respect to a relatively highmance if the action's maintenance indicators warranted relalevel identity, then, changes in its lower level manifestations over tively low-level identification. The person might move to lower time do not necessarily signal inconsistency. Indeed, a certain levels in accord with the third principle, but the cues to higher .. amount of flexibility is often necessary to maintain a broadly level meanings may not be sufficiently ignored to allow approconceived action. Consistency and flexibility, however, take on priate attention to detail. Indeed, because the low-level state different meanings when viewed in terms of low-level action sensitizes one to higher level identities, the movement to low control. If consistency exists at all for an action identified at a level in the face of high-level failure could ensure that the person low level, it is because of stable environmental cues that keep would keep mindful of the disruptive higher level identities. In the person mindful of the task at hand. Flexibility, meanwhile, support of this reasoning, several lines of research have conreflects impulsive emergence to new courses of action when the verged on the notion that social and environmental pressures environmental cues change. An action controlled at a low level, to do well, engendered by such things as the promise of reward then, cannot be consistent and flexible at the same time; which or threat of punishment, competition, audience evaluation, and orientation predominates depends on the constancy of the acthe like, tend to facilitate performance on simple or welltion context. learned tasks but to impair performance on difficult or unfamiliar tasks (e.g., Berlyne, 1963; Cofer & Appley, 1964; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Zajonc, 1965) . Such factors are similar in that Performance Impairment they emphasize the higher level meanings and effects of one's action.
In view of these differences between low-and high-level idenAt the same time, action control can be attempted at too low tification, it is tempting to view higher level states as preferable. a level. Just as difficult or unfamiliar action can be impaired by High-level understanding seems to come closer to capturing the high-level identities made available by the action's context, so essence of knowing what one is doing, and the stability and flextoo can easy or familiar action be disrupted when the context ibility of action associated with the high-level state sound prefcalls attention to the lower level aspects of one's action. Indeed, erable to the inconsistency versus rigidity characterizing lower the idea that overlearned performance can be debilitated by exlevels of identification. High levels of identification can prove plicit attention to mechanistic aspects of action represents anto be a mixed blessing, however. Particularly in contexts where other well-established empirical generalization regarding hubehavior is highly scripted (Schank & Abelson, 1977) , the inatman performance (e.g., Bryan & Harter, 1899; Kimble & Perltention to detail and nuance that comes with high-level action muter, 1970; Langer & Imber, 1979) . Thus, for an expert typist, control can appear to be "mindless" rather than thoughtful attention to key selection and finger movements can produce (Langer, 1978) . In terms of our account, of course, mindless errors and disrupt rhythm, just as an experienced driver's attenaction is a somewhat misleading term. The principles of the tion to pedal pushing and steering wheel rotation can introduce theory suggest that well-learned, automated acts are performed awkwardness into driving. Not only are low-level identities unwith a representation of the act in mind, just as difficult, unfanecessary for easy-to-maintain action, then, but their prepomiliar acts are. If the person does not seem to know what he or tence can also serve to disintegrate an action normally inteshe is doing-that is, if he or she appears to be acting mindgrated with respect to a higher level understanding. An action lessly-it is because the observer (or psychologist, for that matthat flows smoothly when enacted at high level can become ter) is identifying the action at a different level. choppy when enacted at low level. Nonetheless, it is possible for action control to be attempted
The context of action thus holds potential for impairing acat too high a level. Our data demonstrate, of course, that people tion performance, pulling the person away from an identificatend to gravitate toward a level of identification that is wartion level determined by personal action difficulty. The manifesranted by the action's difficulty and tation of this potential, however, is probably tempered by peoto embrace higher levels of identification only when their expepIe's self-selection of settings in which to act. The random rience readies them for such understanding (Vallacher, Wegner, assignment of people to conditions in psychological research & Frederick, 1981) . This tendency should not be taken to mean provides valuable insight into the effects of audience pressure, that people always think about what they are doing in the competition, and the like on performance quality, of course, but "right" way, however. People choke under pressure, suffer from it almost certainly overestimates the fr~uency of performance evaluation apprehension, get distracted, lose concentration, reimpairment in daily life. More often than not, people seek out vert to old habits, worry about failure, get overconfident, and new and more demanding contexts for action only when their in other ways manage to approach action with a dysfunctional experience and skill readies them for higher level challenges. mental set (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Berlyne, 1963; Carver & Thus, whereas an inexperienced tennis player is likely to shy Scheier, 1981; Norman & Shallice, 1980; Reason & Mycielska, away from a tennis court surrounded by observers, a more pro-1982; Rosenberg, 1965; Sarason, 1972; Schwartz, 1982; Wine, ficient player might actively seek out a context that renders 1971). The convergence on a maintainable identification level "demonstrating skill" or "impressing an audience" prepotent "', ",'" """" ',Iio at the expense of more elementary act identities. More generthat he or she is responding to presses in the immediate situaally, when a given act identity becomes relatively easy to maintion. tain, the person is in a preemergence state and thus is sensitive Given the flexibility associated with high-level action control, to new action contexts that would impart higher level underthis criterion of personal versus situational causation is clearly standing to the action. This sort of self-selection could ensure inadequate. The person might "act sociably," for instance, by that most people will undertake action with respect to an opti-"joking around" on one occasion and by "discussing the world's 11 mal level of identification much of the time. problems" on another. To someone not privy to the high-level I i identity operating in both instances, these behaviors might Personal Versus Situational Causation seem independent or even inconsistent with respect to a trait ! dimension like humorous versus serious. By the same token, an [ In discussions of action control, it is common to distinguish observer might note cross-situational consistency when none .I between personal and situational causation. This purported diexists from the person's point of view. The person might help I chotomy lies at the heart of a continuing controversy in personan elderly person cross the street, for example, and sometime i ality and social psychology concerning the determinants of belater assist someone of the opposite sex in retrieving a dropped I havior (see, e.g., Bowers, 1973; Epstein, 1979 Epstein, , 1983 ; Mischel, armload of books. Though both actions seem like "being help-1968; Mischel & Peake, 1982) , and judging by theories of causal ful" to the observer, the person may have performed them under attribution, it is of burning interest to laypersons as well vastly different high-level identities-"show respect for the el- (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967) . The basic derly" and "strike up a friendship." issue seems simple enough: When a person does something, is A related criterion for determining personal versus situait because of his or her personal penchant for behaving that way tional causation concerns the uniqueness of a person's behavior or because of some aspect of the action context that would elicit vis-a-vis others in a given situation. According to this criterion, that behavior from most anyone? Phrased more concretely, which finds expression in influential models of causal attribudoes behavior reflect a manifestation of personality traits, selftion (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967) , the person is said conceived values, and other inner qualities, or a response to reto be acting in accordance with inner determinants (traits, valwards, punishments, and other inducements to action in the ues, etc.) to the extent that his or her behavior deviates from the situation?
behavior typical of people in that situation. Conversely, ifhis or Strictly speaking, of course, the proximate cause of behavior her behavior matches the observer's expectancy for behavior in is always personal, inasmuch as behavior is initiated and guided that situation (e.g., if the behavior has high consensus across i by a mental representation of the behavior. The issue thus beactors [Kelley, 1967] or is high in social desirability [Jones & ! comes one of locating the source of people's prepotent act idenDavis, 1965]), the person is said to be responding to forces in I tities in their idiosyncratic identity structures versus the context the situation.
surrounding the action. Conceptually, the resolution of this isThe problem noted for the cross-situational consistency crisue involves a straightforward extension of the argument conterion is clearly applicable here as well. Assume, for example, cerning identification level and action control. When a person that the person is observed "discussing sports," and that others undertakes an action with a relatively low-level identity in in that situation are observed doing the same thing. By the withmind, he or she is especially sensitive to contextual information in-situation variability criterion, the person is said to be reconcerning the larger meaning and significance of the act. As spondi~ to the situation. "Discussing sports," however, is only I ' this information is afforded by the situation, the person's prepoone of many possible identities for the person's behavior, any tent act identity-and hence, his or her subsequent behaviorone of which may have been the prepotent identity. Thus, the I may be seen as a reflection of situational factors. On the other person may have entered the situation with only a low-level hand, when a person enters an action context with a relatively identity like "talking" in mind, in which case the social cues to ; high-level identity for his or her action and is able to maintain higher level identities assumed prominence; the person begins this identity throughout the period of enactment, the person "discussing sports" like everyone else, thereby revealing situamay be said to be acting in accordance with personal rather than tional causation. On the other hand, the person may have apsituational considerations. Thus, high-level action control is proached the setting with a higher level identity in mind, such likely to reflect the implementation of one's goals, values, and as "make a good impression," "demonstrate my command of interests rather than reactivity to situational cues.
facts," or "put others at ease." The particular high-level identity Though straightforward conceptually, the person-versus-situ-guiding the person's behavior may surface regularly in his or her ation issue can prove to be quite tricky empirically. The probidentity structure, reflecting stable and idiosyncratic orientalem inheres in the uncertainty of action. Because an action is tions toward behavior-the hallmark of personal causation. open to different identifications, it may be difficult for an obThis reasoning helps to illuminate a purported difference beserver (or a psychologist) to determine whether a person is acttween actors and observers in their respective attribution t~d-ing in accordance with his or her goals, concerns, and so forth, encies. Jones and Nisbett (1971) argued that observers are lDor whether he or she instead is responding to situational cues.
clined toward personal causes in explaining the actor's behavior, The criterion of cross-situational consistency is commonly inwhereas the actor is more inclined toward invoking situational voked to make this determination. Thus, if the person behaves causes. The fact that this difference has been demonstrated in the same way from one context to the next, it can be assumed laboratory experiments (e.g., Storms, 1973) ~d in rath~r unthat he or she is acting out of personal "causes," but if his or her usual natural settings (West, Gunn, & Chermcky, 1975) IS not behavior covaries with contextual factors, it can be assumed too surprising. Given the unfamiliarity of such contexts for ao-contradictory social feedback, the person is said to be especially the second principle of the theory, these results help to clarify inclined to act in accordance with his or her self-conceived valwhen a self-concept is likely to be stable, serving to initiate and ues and behavioral propensities (e.g., Swann, 1983) . maintain action, and when it is likely to be malleable, undergoAction identification theory suggests that both perspectives ing transformation as a result of action. It is not surprising, for are valid, but under different Circumstances. Whether the selfexample, that self-concepts appear to be highly malleable and I ' : concept appears to be stable or malleable depends on the level responsive to social feedback under laboratory conditions (Ger-I ' of identification that is prepotent for a person when he or she gen, 1977) . Subjects in such research are commonly called upon I encounters a situation conducive to self-perception or social to do something unfamiliar (e.g., converse with a stranger over feedback. If the person's identity is at a high enough level, he or headphones) or difficult (e.g., solve anagrams) and to do so in she should show stability, resisting new information afforded an unusual setting (a lab). Such a state of affairs is conducive to by the physical and social environment concerning his or her low-level identification and thus should make subjects sensitive personal attributes and capacities. Under conditions that proto contextual cues regarding the larger meaning of their action. mote a relatively low-level identification, however, contextual It is inevitable, then, that subjects should appear responsive to information regarding one's self is likely to be accepted, for it social feedback delivered by the experimenter or an experimenprovides emergent understanding in accordance with the theotal confederate or that they should come to "discover" what ry's second principle (i.e., movement to higher level prepothey are like in accordance with self-perception dynamics. tence).
In the more routine and familiar contexts pervading everyday Evidence in support of this analysis is provided in a study by life, however, changes in self-concept via social feedback and Wegner et al. (1986, Experiment 2) , alluded to earlier. Subjects self-discovery should be less frequently observed (e.g., Swann & in that study were provided with bogus personality feedback Hill, 1982) , because people are likely to have a relatively highindicating that they were either cooperative or competitive. The level identity for what they are doing. If self-concept change is ostensible data for the personality feedback consisted of a deobserved in daily life, it is because a crucial precondition for scription generated by subjects of a recent social interaction beemergence has been established-a movement to low-level tween them and someone else. Subjects were to generate five identification. People are occasionally asked to recount the deone-sentence descriptions of their behavior in this interaction tails of something they have done, for example, and in this way and enter each into a computer console. Half of the subjects might experience a lower level of identification than would norwere instructed to describe their behavior in relatively low-level mally be the case (as in Wegner et al., 1986 , Experiment 2). terms (e.g., particular comments, questions, and gestures). The
Interruption of ongoing action also occurs with a certain degree other subjects were asked to describe their behavior in higher of regularity in daily life, and this too can promote relatively level terms (e.g., opinions expressed, values communicated, and low-level identification (e.g., Wegner et al., 1984 , Experiment personality traits demonstrated). Subsequent coding of their de-2). These events, and no doubt many others that promote lowscriptions by trained raters showed this manipulation of identilevel identification, make people vulnerable to the information fication level to be effective. The computer then delivered an afforded by the contexts surrounding their action. ostensible personality analysis telling subjects that they were either very cooperative or very competitive.
Summary and Conclusions After examining the feedback, subjects were asked to judge the validity of the feedback and the usefulness of the program Action identification theory is not the first perspective to prothat generated it. As predicted, subjects led to think about their pose explicit links between thinking and doing. Almost a cenbehavior at lower levels expressed greater belief in the bogus tury ago, James (1890) proposed that goal-directed physical feedback and greater confidence in the program than did those movement is preceded by a mental representation of such who were led to conceptualize their behavior in high-level movement. This emphasis on mental representations of action terms. Subjects also completed a questionnaire assessing their has provided the touchstone for virtually every perspective on self-image with respect to 20 personality trait dimensions, inmind and action advanced since James's time. It is common in cluding cooperativeness and competitiveness. Results showed this theoretical tradition to posit a hierarchy-or sometimes a that subjects in the low-level condition rated themselves consisheterarchy-of representations to account for complex goal-ditently with the ostensible feedback; those who received cooperarected action (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gallistel, 1980 ; tiveness feedback rated themselves as more cooperative, Lashley, 1951; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Newell, 1978 ; whereas those who received competitiveness feedback rated Norman, 1981; Powers, 1973; Schank & Abelson, 1977) . The themselves as more competitive. Subjects in the high-level conaction's goal or purpose is said to occupy the highest level in dition meanwhile did not rate themselves in line with the feedsuch hierarchies, whereas subordinate levels serve to subdivide back they had rec~ived. This same pattern was observed when this goal into progressively more concrete representations, until subjects were subsequently given a chance to participate in fua level is reached that specifies the actual movements to be unture research projects that involved cooperative or competitive dertaken. , behavior on their part. Subjects in the low-level condition opted Like other approaches, a~on iden~cation theory e.mp?a-! for a cooperative task if they had received cooperative feedback sizes the mental representatIon of action and the orgaDJZ8;tIOb ut opted for a competitive task if they had received competitive of such representations in a hierarchical str~ctur~. The pnnClfeedback. Subjects in the high-level condition were not influpIes of the theory, however, tend to spawn IdentIty .structu:es enced by the feedback in their choice of future activities.
that lack the symmetry and closure normally .~a~ WlB eyond confirming the emergence phenomenon specified by hierarchies. 
